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1 Introduction: Purpose of Post-Election Violence Survey 
 
1. The post-election violence (PEV) survey supports numerous purposes with respect 
towards measuring progress in the implementation of the Kenya National Dialogue and 
Reconciliation (KNDR) agreements. While objective measures of the implementation of 
specific agenda items may be gathered without a survey, the proper use of a survey 
instrument allows researchers and policymakers to gather data on the perception of 
progress towards implementation that may or may not correlate with actual 
implementation. 
 
2. Specifically, the PEV survey allows us to further probe progress on important elements of 
the KNDR process with respect to those areas most affected by post-election violence. 
Besides the immediate effects of violence, these areas may suffer from political divisions, 
a lack of economic progress, and problems of social cohesion more so than in areas not 
directly affected by fighting. A survey targeted in these areas allows us to easily identify 
the main problems around healing and reconciliation and therefore progress towards 
national cohesion.  
 
3. The benefit of this particular survey comes from our use of open-ended questions to 
better gauge the problems, progress, and solutions advocated by the general public with 
respect to the KNDR agreement. The survey has focused more on what residents thought 
the sources of problems were and their ideas on how to solve them. Moreover, the survey 
design includes a special sampling procedure aimed to target IDPs (see below), as well as 
an additional battery of questions about the situation in IDP camps. 
Survey Design and Field Work 
 
Design 
4. South Consulting produced the survey instrument, supervised field work, and performed 
data analysis. A private research firm performed field work and helped in questionnaire 
production using Formic software as well as automatic data capture. 
 
5.       Prior to finalizing the survey, a pilot survey was undertaken on 28 February and 1-3 
March in Nairobi, Kericho, and Molo. The purpose of the pilot was to field test the 
questionnaire, including question wording and ordering, allowing feedback from 
respondents to interviewers on the ease of answering questions but also feedback from 
interviewers on problems with administering them. 
 
Fieldwork recruitment and training process 
 
6. The fieldwork team comprised a coordinator, supervisors and interviewers. South 
oversaw the entire fieldwork process. This included ensuring that the supervisors had the 
correct sampling distribution list as well as the correct number of the questionnaires as 
per the required distribution and the regions where each supervisor worked. 
 
7. The field supervisors were in charge of  certain number of districts and were tasked to 
accompany interviewers and make sure that they follow the proper respondent selection 
and interviewing procedures, edit questionnaires for completeness in the field, execute 
quality control procedures including conducting mandatory back checks, compiling field 
reports and daily progress updates, plan the interviewing schedules, and maintain 
fieldwork discipline. Interviewers were responsible for conducting the actual survey, 
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following the proper selection procedures by randomly selecting households and 
respondents via Kish Grid and continuing with the survey if the respondent agrees. 
 
8. In addition, South Consulting hired the services of at least 10 field supervisors to 
complement the efforts of the Steadman Group in the field exercise. The main task of 
these supervisors was to audit the field exercise and ensure that the fieldwork was 
implemented as designed. During the fieldwork, the South Supervisors witnessed some 
of the interviews as well as performing back-checks. 
 
Pre-test and Actual Fieldwork 
9.      The fieldwork exercise was preceded by a pilot study carried out between February 28th 
2009 and March 2nd 2009. The pre-test was done in Nairobi, Kipkelion and Molo. 
Nairobi and Kipkelion were selected for the pre-test due to their urban and rural 
characteristics respectively. Molo was selected for the pre-test so as to test the study tool 
among the internally displaced persons. However, each of these regions experienced PEV 
although in varying degree of magnitude. Actual fieldwork began on 7 March 2009 and 
continued until completion on 14 March 2009. The fieldwork commenced in all areas 
concurrently. 
 
Field Quality Control Procedures 
10. During fieldwork, the survey teams conducted interviews in either English or Kiswahili 
depending on the language respondents preferred. This was done to ensure the 
respondents were at ease all through the interviewing process. 
 
11. The supervisors ensured that they checked 100% of the questionnaires on a daily basis 
for completeness. Any questionnaire found to have incomplete details was referred back 
to the field the following day for corrections. 
 
12. The project coordinator and supervisors accompanied over 11% of the interviews. This 
ensured that interviewers follow instructions. In total, each interviewer was 
accompanied at least 3 times during fieldwork. Supervisors also back-checked 20% of the 
interviews to ensure proper conduct of fieldwork and prevent shirking. 
Sampling Methodology 
 
13. The survey is designed to achieve a sample of 1,500 Kenyans aged 18 and over in areas 
affected by PEV (producing a 95% confidence level and a sampling error of +/- 2.47%). It 
is important that strict scientific sampling guidelines, including randomization, are 
always followed so that the sample drawn is an accurate reflection of the population at 
large. Any attempts at “purposeful selection” are avoided to prevent unscientific 
conclusions. 
 
14. The survey relied upon multi-stage cluster sampling using the 1999 National Population 
and Housing Census as the sampling frame. First, 1,500 interviews were proportionally 
allocated to all of the districts affected by post-election violence, as identified in the Waki 
Report, the Ministry of Special Programs and the international humanitarian 
intervention ‘hubs’ and coordination clusters. This included areas in Nairobi, Central, 
Rift Valley, Nyanza, and Western provinces. If a district recorded incidences of PEV, we 
included it in the sample. If districts did not, they were excluded. As such, enumeration 
occurred in twenty-six districts, following the district names and boundaries that were in 
place during the post-election and reflect those in the census (although some areas of 
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Mombasa district did experience violence, we decided to perform focus groups there 
given the highly concentrated and localized form of violence in that district).  
 
15. Within each district, there was further allocated samples to randomly selected 
enumeration areas (sub-locations). This yielded 150 enumeration areas across the 
twenty-six districts. Interviewers travelled to those enumeration areas and began 
household selection from local sampling points. This method was also used for 
enumeration areas that were IDP camps, where tent structures were considered 
households. 
 
16.       Once households were selected, interviewers approached the first person they saw at the 
house and then proceed to randomly select respondents using the Kish Grid, a 
standardized tool for household selection. This method applied for respondents chosen 
from tent structures in IDP camps as well. There were no age, gender, or other 
purposeful quotas attempted—all respondents were randomly chosen. The interviewers 
then used the last digit of the serial number on the questionnaire to select the 
respondent to be interviewed (only members of the household 18 years and older are 
listed in the Kish Grid). In instances where the selected respondent was not available at 
the time of call, three call backs were made in an attempt to find the respondent. 
 
17. In addition to the sample of 1,500 respondents in PEV areas, we also conducted 200 
interviews in IDP camps, where we administered the same battery of questions as the 
larger sample, but also questions dealing in particular with issues faced by IDPs and the 
condition of life in the camps. These included 11 camps in Rift Valley. Similar procedures 
of random selection of living structures inside of camps and respondents follow the 
household and respondent selection described above. See Annex for the sampling 
distributions. 
Data Management (Post­fieldwork) 
 
18. The South Consulting team oversaw the process of data management. During the data 
processing exercise, following best practice, South’s supervisor randomly validated at 
least 10% (170 questionnaires) and Steadman’s supervisor randomly validated at least 
15% of the questionnaires. Overall, South closely checked the process to ensure that valid 
data was captured. The data was then exported to SPSS for further cleaning, validation 
and analysis. The analysis was then handed over to the south research officers for report 
writing. 
Questionnaire Design 
 
19. The questionnaire included two important components. The first involved questions 
regarding the four agenda areas, with particular reference to how respondents perceive 
the source and solution to immediate and long-standing issues addressed by the 
National Accord. In particular, this included the use of multiple open-ended questions to 
allow for more in-depth responses that were coded and aggregated in post-fieldwork 
analysis. The second involved questions for IDPs specifically, especially considering the 
conditions in camps. 
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Demographic Profile of Survey 
 
20. Table 1 presents the demographic profile of the PEV survey. Notice that these 
proportions do not necessarily represent the Kenyan population generally because the 
survey is limited to PEV areas only. 
Table 1: Demographic Profile 
Setting   Highest level of education 
Rural 92%  No formal schooling 8% 
Urban 8%  Primary education 43% 
   Secondary school education 38% 
Gender   Post secondary college education 9% 
Male 50%  University education 2% 
Female 50%  
Age   Employment 
18 - 25 yrs 29%  Casual/piece jobs 10% 
26 - 30 yrs 19%  Working full-time 27% 
31 - 35 yrs 12%  Working part-time 14% 
36 - 40 yrs 12%  Pensioner 2% 
41 - 45 yrs 7%  Unemployed 33% 
46 - 50 yrs 7%  Housewife taking care of home full-time 11% 
51 - 55 yrs 4%  Other (Unspecified) 1% 
56 - 60 yrs 4%  Student 2% 
61+ yrs 6%    
Religion   Ethnic Community 
Protestant                        62%      Kalenjin 27% 
Catholic 26%  Luhya 23% 
Muslim 1%  Kikuyu 19% 
Other 8%  Luo 13% 
Traditional <1%  Kisii 9% 
Rta 1%  Maasai 4% 
   Other 5% 
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Key Findings 
Agenda Item 1: Immediate Action to Stop Violence and Restore Fundamental 
Rights and Liberties  
Violence 
 
21. An immediate concern for Kenyan citizens involves the propensity for violence, 
especially given recent challenges facing the working of the Coalition government and 
the fact that national level political conflicts tend to trickle to the local level where they 
heighten animosity between groups. Chart 1 shows that despite ongoing issues, only 
about a quarter of respondents (26%) in areas affected by post-election violence (PEV) 
think that violence will occur in their area in the twelve months, whereas 63% did not 
think so and 11% remained unsure. Given that the survey was limited to PEV areas, this 
result might provide an encouraging sign that those most affected by post-election 
violence remain sceptical about future violence. However, events could easily change 
this, especially because of lack of cohesion within the Coalition. 
Chart 1: Do you think violence is likely to occur in this area in the next twelve months? 
 
 
22. For those who answered that they did think violence would occur in their areas in the 
coming year, we asked a follow-up open-ended question probing their reasons for saying 
that they thought violence would occur. A plurality attributes the potential for future to 
violence to “fighting within government” (28%). Moreover, 7% thought political 
incitement and 7% thought differences between political parties could contribute to 
violence. Further responses show the importance of governance: 4% blame a lack of 
justice, 4% corruption, and 3% leader who will not fulfil promises. Taken together, a 
majority of 53% blame some aspect of poor government. This demonstrates the 
perceived relationship between the ability of the Coalition to work together and levels of 
violence in the eyes of the public.  
 
23. Other responses focused on more social problems at the community level. 11% replied 
that tribalism would produce violence; while 5% felt the same way about tension, and 4% 
disagreements in the community. 24% provided other responses. 
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Table 2: Why do you think violence will occur? 
 
Fighting within government 28% 
Tribalism 11% 
Political incitement 7% 
Differences between political parties 7% 
Tension 5% 
Lack of justice 4% 
Disagreements in the community 4% 
Corruption 4% 
Leaders will not fulfill promises 3% 
To create more jobs 3% 
Other 24% 
 
24. To the same population who answered that they believed violence could occur, we asked 
them who they think would be responsible for such acts. The most popular responses 
were politicians (33%), political supporters (27%), members of rival ethnic groups (19%), 
gangs (8%), militias (5%), and the police (4%). 5% replied “other.” Aggregating the 
responses on politicians and political supporters leaves 60% who attribute potential 
violence to political actors, once again underscoring the importance of good governance 
towards the promotion of peace. 
 
25. Similarly, we asked those who replied that they did not think violence would recur why 
they thought so. 40% replied that there was peace in their region, 17% believe people 
have learned that violence does not help, 11% say their areas contain members of the 
same tribe or that their area lacks tribalism, and 5% mention that members of their 
community are concentrated on development and not fighting. 24% provided other 
responses and 4% refused to answer. 
 
26. We asked all respondents the best ways they think to prevent violence are in Kenya. We 
allowed for up to three responses and present aggregated results. 
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Graph 1: What are the most important ways to prevent future violence in Kenya? 
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27. While a plurality believe that fighting tribalism is the best way to prevent violence (19%), 
additional responses relate directly to aspects of the Agenda items specified in the KNDR 
agreement. 15% believe conducing free and fair elections is key to curtailing violence, 
while 12% think that reconciliation is important, as well as fighting unemployment (12%) 
and prosecuting those who are guilty for crimes (12%). Similarly, 11% believe stopping 
incitement by politicians remains imperative, along with fighting poverty (10%) and land 
reform (7%). 2% provided other responses. 
Militias 
 
28. We asked whether there had been local organised armed groups who committed acts of 
post-election violence in the respondents’ area, and found that only 18% of the sample 
replied “yes.” 80% said “no” while 2% were unsure. Because the survey was conducted in 
PEV areas only, this suggests that the presence of militias may be much smaller than the 
problem of violence more generally, at least as the public perceives the existence of 
militias. Of those who replied that there had been militias operating in their area, only 
43% reply that they have been disbanded, while 46% say they have not and 11% remain 
unsure. Thus, while limited even within PEV areas, the threat from militias does remain. 
 
29. Graph 2 shows aggregated responses from an open-ended question that allowed the sub-
sample of people who responded “no” to the question on whether militias had been 
demobilized in their area to provide their reasons for why they think militias have not 
been disbanded. 
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Graph 2: Why do you think these groups have not been disbanded or demobilized in your 
area? 
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30. The results do not bode well for perceptions of how well the Coalition government is 
performing in addressing the problem of militias. Nearly a third do not believe the 
government is at all committed to addressing the problem of militias (32%), while 
another 27% blame politicians for supporting and/or financing them. 25% blame police 
incompetence in trying to arrest militia members, while 7% blame the structure of 
militias themselves as the reason they continue to thrive. 2% do not know. 
 
Table 3 reveals how Kenyans in PEV areas believe that militias ought to be dealt with. 
 
Table 3: What is the best way to disband and demobilize armed groups in Kenya? 
 
Prosecute their leaders and members 24% 
Opening dialogue with groups 11% 
Increase security by hiring more personnel 11% 
Educating the community 7% 
Increased searches for illegal weapons 6% 
Preaching peace and reconciliation 4% 
Government to disband militias 4% 
Stop their sponsors 4% 
Don’t Know 4% 
Other 25% 
 
31. Results from Table 3 provide strong recommendations for the Coalition government 
towards ending militias and thereby providing population protection of citizens. First 
and foremost, Kenyans most affected by the violence agree that militia leaders and 
members ought to be prosecuted (24%), followed by those who believe in opening up 
dialogue (11%) and hiring more security personnel (11%). 7% think the educating the 
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 community is required, while 6% want stronger police work in the search for illegal 
weapons that are used by militias. Preaching peace and reconciliation (4%), government 
disbanding militias (4%), and stopping sponsors (4%) also remain important for the 
public. 4% don’t know, and 25% provided other responses. 
 
32. When asked who they think finances militias, respondents in PEV areas provide an even 
more critical of the government. 37% blame politicians, 13% blame political parties, and 
10% blame the government. Taken together, 60% of responses declare Kenyan political 
actors as the financiers of militia violence. 11% attribute responsibility to business 
people, while 8% say ordinary citizens and 7% community elders. 10% don’t know, 4% 
provided other responses, while 1% refused to answer. 
Fundamental Freedoms 
33. Chart 2 shows the lack of public confidence in the government’s reaction to public 
demonstrations. 
 
Chart 2: Do you think the government’s response to public demonstrations today is likely to be 
forceful/violent or not likely to be forceful/violent? 
 
Violent
58%
Not Violent
33%
Don't Know
9%
 
 
 
34. Data from this question show a clear lack of faith amongst respondents that the 
government will act appropriately and refrain from violence during public 
demonstrations. 58% believe the government will use force against people in 
demonstrations, showing a clear curtailment of the freedom to assemble. 
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Agenda Item 2: Addressing the Humanitarian Crisis, Promoting Healing 
and Reconciliation 
 
35. One potential concern for residents in PEV areas is the existence and location of 
Internally Displaced Peoples (IDPs). While the Coalition government claims that all 
camps have been closed and members relocated, this is in fact not the case; some IDPs 
have relocated to ‘transit camps’ while a few camps are still in place and have IDPs who 
have declined to move out.  Without government protection, and an effective 
resettlement programme, IDPs remain vunerable and hostilities between IDPs and other 
community members may exacerbate conflict and serve to undermine progress on 
various agenda items. 
 
36. In this section, we begin by presenting evidence about perceptions of IDPs from the PEV 
public, and then present results from IDPs specifically. 
Perceptions of IDPs 
 
37. When asked if there were any people displaced from their homes in the areas inhabited 
by the respondents, 30% of those sampled in PEV areas replied “yes.” Of those who 
replied yes, we asked a follow-up question as to whether IDPs had been resettled in that 
area, stay in IDP camps, or have relocated to other areas. 63% reply that they have 
mostly been resettled, 6% remain mostly in IDP camps, and 26% relocated to other 
areas. 2% don’t know and 2% refused to answer. 
 
38. For those who replied “mostly resettled in this area,” we asked what the respondents 
thought was the most important concern for IDPs that have been resettled locally. 
 
Table 4: What do you think is the most important concern for IDPs who have been 
resettled in this area? 
 
Food 40% 
Livelihood 14% 
Security 13% 
Healing and reconciliation 9% 
Shelter 8% 
Land 7% 
Other 2% 
Refused to answer 6% 
Don’t know 1% 
 
39. Table 4 makes clear the needs of IDPs who have been resettled as perceived by members 
of those communities. A large plurality perceive food as the most important concern 
(40%), followed by livelihood (14%) and security (13%). Thus, “bread and butter” issues 
of basic living and survival remain important.  
 
40. While post-election violence produced nearly 600,000 IDPs, their status remains 
controversial. The government denies their existence, claiming that all IDP camps have 
been closed. Moreover, the degree to which IDPs have been re-integrated into their own 
communities or been pushed to other communities remains contentious and 
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problematic. Additionally, there are some perceptions amongst the public that non-IDPs 
might be posing as such in order to access government funds. 
 
41. To gauge potential levels of hostility towards IDPs, we asked what respodents thought 
was the most important reason IDPs remain in camps. The answers we provided were 1) 
“fear of attacks if they go home” 2) “awaiting government funds” 3) “they lack land to go 
to” or 4) “do you think IDPs are not genuine.” Chart 3 presents these results.  
 
Chart 3: What is the most important reasons IDPs remain in camps? 
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42. In general, the results from Chart 3 show that by and large, the public is attuned to the 
needs of IDPs that remain in camps. Rather than assert that these IDPs are false and 
simply posing as such to access government services (6%), a large plurality believe that 
the IDPs fear for their safety (42%), are awaiting government funds (27%), or lack land 
to return to (25%). 3% don’t know, 2% had other responses, and 2% refused to answer. 
The public in PEV areas thus remain sensitive to the needs of IDPs in camps. 
 
43. Table 5 shows how people think the government can address the problem of IDPs. Once 
again, this question was asked of the entire PEV sample, not just IDPs, so its results 
demonstrated the perceptions of the population living in PEV areas, but not necessarily 
IDPs themselves. 
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Table 5: What is the most important thing the government can do to address the problem of 
people displaced by post-election violence in Kenya? 
 
 Give financial assistance 37% 
Resettle them here 17% 
Take them back to their ancestral districts 15% 
Promoting peace and reconciliation 10% 
Increase security 9% 
Other 8% 
Don’t know 2% 
Refused to answer 2% 
 
44. By and large, the public in PEV areas remain supportive of IDPs, saying that the 
government should give them financial assistance (37%), resettle them locally (17%), 
promote peace and reconciliation (10%) and increase security (9%). However, results 
from this question show some level of antagonism towards IDPs, as 15% think the 
government should take them back to their ancestral districts. This demonstrates a 
level—albeit small—of tension between some IDPs and other people within PEV areas. 
8% of respondents provide other responses, while 2% don’t know and 2% refused to 
answer. 
 
Graph 3 shows a subsequent question that allows us to gain better leverage on the 
perceived relationship between the public and IDPs. 
 
Graph 3: What is the nature of the relationship between IDPs and the other people in your 
area? 
 
 
 
45. Graph 3 also supports the general view that IDPs and others generally get along (43%), 
but with low levels of tension (16%), threats (1%), or fighting (<1%). 12% don’t know and 
1% refused to answer. For 27% of respondents, the question was not applicable. 
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IDP Survey 
  
46. As explained in the methodology section above, we include on the survey a special 
section for IDP respondents. 72 of these respondents appeared in the normal survey 
sample (N=1,500) through normal selection procedure; we also sampled 200 IDPs from 
IDP camps. We present the data from questions that were asked specifically to these 
IDPs but not others. We include responses from the 72 IDPs in the normal sample and 
the 200 IDPs in the IDP sample. 
 
Table 6: In the last three months, did any of the following give you assistance? 
 
 IDP 
Sample 
  Normal 
Sample 
  
 Yes No RTA Yes No RTA 
Government 24% 67% 9% 15% 74% 11% 
Kenya Red Cross 75% 20% 5% 38% 50% 12% 
NGOs 35% 55% 10% 21% 67% 12% 
Religious groups 56% 36% 8% 35% 53% 12% 
UNHCR 38% 51% 11% 14% 69% 17% 
Individuals 47% 44% 9% 57% 26% 17% 
Private Sector 21% 64% 15% 14% 69% 17% 
 
47. Table 6 shows that for IDPs still in camps, if they have received assistance, it is most 
likely to have come from Kenya Red Cross (75%) or religious groups (56%). IDPs not in 
camps are most likely to have received assistance from other individuals (57%) and 
Kenya Red Cross (38%).  
 
48. With respect to funds provided by the government, 83% of IDPs sampled in camps have 
received money from the government, while only 21% of IDPs in the normal sample 
have. For those IDPS in camps who answered that they have received money; 81% have 
received the amount of 10,000 Kshs, 6% have received 25,000 Kshs, and 13% have 
received both. 64% report that there were problems with the disbursement of the money. 
Conversely for the normal sample, 87% have received 10,000 Kshs, 7% have received 
25,000 Kshs, and another 6% have received both. 43% report that there were problems 
with disbursement of this money. 
 
49. Table 7 reports the problems that each sample had with the disbursements. By and large 
these relate to the administration of the program, including names missing from lists, 
incorrect government records, and inadequate and/or contradictory information. IDPs 
also report problems of corruption, including money being given to non-IDPs and 
reports of officials asking for bribes. 
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Table 7: What were the problems with the disbursement of this money? 
 
 IDP Sample Normal Sample 
Names missing from lists 34% 22% 
Incorrect government records 17% 14% 
Money given to non-IDPs 16% 16% 
Asked for bribes 13% 16% 
Lack of ID documents 11% 9% 
Inadequate/contradictory information  10% 16% 
Other 1% 7% 
 
50. We follow-up by asking both sets of IDPs how they think disbursement can be improved 
in Table 8. The results here echo the problems identified above, relating to both the 
administration of the program and levels of corruption, where respondents are calling 
for better accountability, transparency, and oversight. 
 
Table 8: How do you think the disbursement of money can be improved? 
 
 IDP Sample Normal 
Sample 
Transparency through their records 23% 12% 
Identify and give money fairly to the genuine IDPs 16% 15% 
Avoid corrupt officials 12% 10% 
IDPs should be involved 9% 8% 
Involvement of a neutral body 9% 8% 
None 9% 16% 
Involvement of local authorities 5% 14% 
They should be given cheques 4% 7% 
Accountability through follow ups from the government 2% 3% 
Other 11% 7% 
 
51. We asked the IDPs in the camps the most important challenges they face as an IDP, and 
allowed for up to three responses. Graph 4 shows what they first responded as the single 
most important challenge (the light blue bar), as well as the aggregated responses they 
gave for all challenges (the red bar). 
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Graph 4: Most important challenges facing IDPs (most important and aggregated responses) 
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52. Unsurprisingly, the concerns of IDPs who remain in camps revolve around basic 
necessities, including food and shelter. Table 9 compares responses from the IDPs and 
the general public from PEV areas on the most important challenges facing IDPs. 
Responses from both mostly accord, demonstrating consensus of both IDPs and non-
IDPs about the problems facing IDPs. 
 
Table 9: Comparison of responses from IDPs and PEV public regarding most important 
issue facing IDPs 
  
 IDPs General Public 
Food 68% 40% 
Shelter 12% 8% 
Livelihood 9% 14% 
Land 6% 7% 
Healthcare 2% 0% 
Education 2% 0% 
Security 2% 13% 
Healing and reconciliation 0% 9% 
Other 0% 2% 
Don’t know 0% 1% 
Refused to answer 0% 6% 
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Healing and Reconciliation 
 
53. A majority of Kenyans living in PEV areas report that there have been local activities to 
promote healing and reconciliation. 37% say peace meetings, committees, and 
workshops have taken place, while another 14% reply religious crusades, 8% awareness 
creation, sports and games (7%), counselling services (6%), and women’s initiatives (4%) 
occurred. 21% report that no activities have been pursued in their area, while 2% don’t 
know and 1% gave other replies. 
 
54. Kenyans in PEV areas also remain cautiously optimistic about the success of the 
promotion of healing and reconciliation among communities in their areas. Chart 4 
presents these results. 
 
Chart 4: How successful are the efforts at promoting healing and reconciliation among 
communities in your area? 
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55. The perceptions of Kenyans in the sample show that efforts at reconciliation are making 
important progress. However, with 58% saying they are somewhat successful and 6% not 
successful, there is room for improvement. 33% think they are very successful, while 1% 
aren’t sure and 2% refused to answer. But once again, because the survey is limited to 
PEV areas, we expect these locations to have the most difficulty with healing; yet 
improvements are being felt by the communities in these places. 
 
56. We asked a follow-up question regarding what respondents perceive to be the most 
important challenges to healing and reconciliation efforts in their areas. 21% reply 
“tribalism” while 18% say “mistrust between ethnic groups.” Taken together, this shows 
that inter-communal tensions do remain. 15% blame political statements, 13% land 
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disputes, 11% no involvement by residents, and 7% criminals who committed acts of 
violence are still free. 6% reply that people are too traumatized, 5% don’t know, and 4% 
gave other responses. These answers provide important implications for the actions of 
the Coalition government in making progress on Agenda Item 2. Problems such as 
political incitement and land disputes are at the source of numerous challenges that 
remain, including with respect towards the promotion of reconciliation. 
 
57. Interestingly, Kenyans in PEV areas do not view all political and religious leaders equally 
likely towards affecting positive change to promote healing and reconciliation. 
 
Chart 5: Which of the following do you think has the greatest influence at promoting healing 
and reconciliation among groups in Kenya? 
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58. The results from Chart 5 demonstrate an important point with who the public perceive is 
likely to impact the healing and reconciliation efforts. There may be a larger role for civil 
society than policy-makers appreciate. A full 58% of the public perceive non-state actors 
are likely agents of change, including 48% for religious leaders, 8% for NGOs, and 2% for 
women’s groups. Only 37% rely on state actors, including 29% for politicians and 8% for 
the provincial administrations. These results could reflect the perceived inefficiencies of 
governmental actors towards attempting change, and/or a concomitant perceived 
strength attributed to civil society leaders and groups. 
 
59. Graph 5 gauges the public’s suggestions at promoting reconciliation in their own 
communities. We allowed for and then aggregate three open-ended responses. 
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Graph 5: Regardless of what has been tried already, please tell me the three best ways to 
pursue reconciliation in your community?  
 
 
 
60. Once again, ending tribalism (22%) remains a central concern with respect to healing 
and reconciliation. But the results also provide clear guidance for the Coalition 
government. More jobs (15%), prosecuting those guilty for PEV (14%), establishing a 
Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission (12%), enacting a land policy (11%), 
reducing inequality (9%), and providing more services (8%) all remain important paths 
towards promoting healing and reconciliation, and fall under the purview of other 
agenda items and require government action. 7% had other responses, while 2% don’t 
know. 
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Agenda Item 3: Resolving the Political Crisis (Power Sharing) 
 
61. Given the contested nature of politics in PEV areas, citizens in these locales remain 
sensitive to how well the Coalition government shares power, as well as sharing a similar 
concern to all Kenyans as to how the government performs. 
Power­Sharing   
 
62. Only 21% of the PEV population thinks that they Coalition government works well 
together; a full 77% think it does not work well together. 2% is unsure. Table 10 shows 
the ways that the public think the Coalition government can work well together. 
 
Table 10: What is the most important thing that the Coalition government can do to 
work well together 
 
Unity within political parties 20% 
Solve differences 11% 
Fight corruption 7% 
Focus on the interests of the public 6% 
Create more jobs 5% 
Renegotiate power-sharing 4% 
Reconciliation 4% 
Reduce the price of goods 4% 
Other 34% 
No response 5% 
 
63. The diversity of responses provided, as well as their relatively low magnitude, suggest 
that there is little consensus among the sampled population on the most important thing 
the Coalition government can do to work better. A plurality (20%) blames a lack of unity 
within political parties. The rest of the responses focus on the ability of the Coalition 
members to solve their differences (11%), fight corruption (7%), focus on the interest of 
the public (6%), and livelihood issues such as creating more jobs (5%) and reducing the 
price of goods (4%). Surprisingly, only 4% mentioned a renegotiation of power-sharing 
as the most important component of working better together. 34% gave other responses, 
while 5% gave no response. 
 
64. Residents also remain sceptical about the working relationship between the two main 
principals to the Coalition government, President Kibaki and Prime Minister Odinga. 
Only 7% of the public in PEV areas are satisfied with the working relationship. 32% are 
somewhat satisfied with the relationship, for a combined satisfaction level of 39%. 29% 
prove somewhat dissatisfied, while 30% are very dissatisfied for a combined 
dissatisfaction level of 59%. 1% don’t know and 1% refused to answer. These findings are 
not surprising in light of continued tensions between the two leaders in government, 
including the lack of clarification on roles and responsibilities as specified in the 
National Accord. 
  
65. With respect to whether Prime Minister Odinga is exercising his powers of office, 33% 
think that yes he is; while 53% say no, he is not and 12% are unsure. 2% refused to 
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answer. For those who answered yes or no, we asked a follow-up question as to why 
respondents thought so. 
 
Table 11: Why do you think Prime Minister Odinga is/is not exercising his powers of 
office? 
 
He has not fulfilled pledges 10% 
He has brought development 10% 
He has no powers 9% 
There are other influential people in the government 8% 
Kibaki is still very powerful 8% 
He is uniting Kenyans 4% 
He supervises government ministries 3% 
Reduced Corruption 3% 
Other 34% 
Don’t know 11% 
  
66. The large number of “other” categories (34%), in addition to small proportions for all 
other answers, demonstrate a low level of agreement with respect to Prime Minister 
Odinga’s exercise of powers. Some are willing to blame Odinga, saying “he has not 
fulfilled pledges” (10%). Others blame other aspects of the Coalition, saying “he has no 
powers” (9%), “there are other influential people in the government” (8%), and “Kibaki is 
still very powerful” (8%). Others provide more sanguine views of Odinga’s exercise of 
power, mentioning that “he has brought development” (10%), “he is uniting Kenyans” 
(4%), “he supervises government ministries” (3%), and “reduced corruption” (3%). 
Future of the Coalition Government 
 
67. While the Coalition government received initial support from much of the Kenyan 
public, the population within PEV areas provides perceptions as to how they think 
people in their communities will react if the Coalition breaks up before the next election. 
The results are not encouraging for stability and achieving peace. 33% comment that 
people within their communities will support a break-up, 25% say people will 
demonstrate, and 22% say they will attack other communities. These results show at the 
very least plurality support for ending the Coalition government, as well as the real 
likelihood that such an event would reignite violence. 7% reply that community members 
will ask for another general election, while 8% remain unsure. 4% provided other 
responses. 
Performance of the Police 
 
68. Given the recent release of information regarding police brutality and extra-judicial 
killings, as highlighted in the Waki Report, the report by UN rapporteur Philip Alston, 
and ongoing problems between the outlawed Mungiki sect and police; we probed 
respondents for their views of recent police performance. 
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Graph 6: How do you rate the performance of the police in protecting the rights of Kenyans 
within the last three months? 
 
 
 
69. Indeed, citizens remain sensitive to the performance of the police, who are not 
performing well. Only 25% gave them a positive rating, with 4% saying “excellent” and 
21% “good.” A quarter (26%) replied “just fair” and nearly half, 47%, says “poor.” The 
police therefore earned a largely negative (73%) performance rating, suggesting needed 
improvements in their ability to provide population security while upholding the law and 
maintaining standard of justice. 1% don’t know and 1% refused to answer. 
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Agenda Item 4: Long-Standing Issues and Solutions 
 
70. Given that violence was an outcome from many of the long-standing issues raised by 
Agenda Item 4, it is important to measure the views of citizens in PEV areas with respect 
to these needed reforms. 
Constitutional Revision 
  
71. The PEV public remains somewhat sceptical that the Coalition government will have 
succeeded at making a new constitution for Kenyans by March 2010. Giving a positive 
likelihood, 8% say it is “very likely” and 32% “somewhat likely.” Conversely, 31% respond 
“somewhat unlikely” and 29% “very unlikely.” 
 
72. Even more disturbing are evaluations of the efficacy of such a constitution. We asked 
whether respondents thought a new constitution will be satisfactory or unsatisfactory in 
addressing the needs of Kenyans. The results are not hopeful: 52% reply “unsatisfactory” 
while only 34% say “satisfactory.” 14% remain unsure. 
 
73. We follow this question by asking respondents what they think should be included in a 
new constitution to address the needs of most Kenyans (allowing for up to three 
responses). Note that this question specifically asks residents to think about the good of 
most of the country, not just their own individual or community needs. We present 
aggregated responses in Graph 7. 
 
Graph 7: What do you think needs to be included in a new constitution to be satisfactory in 
addressing the needs of most Kenyans? (aggregate responses) 
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74. The PEV public provides a host of answers towards what a new constitution ought to 
include. First are the goods that citizens would accrue from constitutional reform, 
including jobs for the youth (20%), more rights (19%), and the redistribution of 
resources (18%). Second are the institutional reforms accompanying a new constitution, 
including decreasing presidential power (11%), strengthening parliament (7%), majimbo 
(decentralization) (6%), and the creation of a prime minister (4%). 7% don’t know. Taken 
together, this suggests respondents desire both direct benefits from a new constitution, 
as well as strengthening government by providing for new institutional mechanisms. 
 
75. Besides asking the sample what they would like to see in a new constitution, we also 
asked them to assess what are the most important challenges towards constitutional 
reform. The results suggest an important role for the Coalition government and parties 
to it at providing robust leadership. Half of respondents (51%) blame politicians who 
disagree, while 12% blame divisions within political parties, and 10% divisions within the 
Coalition. A further 17% blame problems in society, including 10% who say fighting 
between communities and 7% blame differences in opinion among other actors in 
society. 5% don’t know, 4% gave other responses, and 1% refused to answer. 
Land Reform 
 
76. The problems over land usage rights and subsequent communal conflict centred on land 
remains an important issue particular to PEV locations. Therefore, responses from these 
areas about how best to achieve land reform ought to directly inform the path to reform. 
 
Table 12: List three things that the Coalition government must do to address land problems 
in your community (aggregate responses) 
 
Enact laws to assist in settling disputes 24% 
Distribute land to the landless 23% 
Ensure land grabbers have surrendered illegally owned land 20% 
Prioritize land allocation to the local community 11% 
Allow for both men and women to inherit land 7% 
Allow communities only to own land in their ancestral homes 5% 
Issue title deeds 4% 
Other 4% 
Don’t know 2% 
 
77. The results in Table 12 demonstrate a number of important findings. First, PEV residents 
prove particularly sensitive to the discord created from a clear land policy. 24% think 
laws must be enacted to settle land disputes and 20% say that land grabbers should be 
forced to surrender illegally owned land. Second, respondents by and large a more fair 
distribution of land, with 23% wanting distribution to the landless, 11% prioritizing land 
allocation to local communities, 7% arguing for gender equity where men and women 
can both inherit land, with 4% who mention issuing title deeds. Third, a small percentage 
(5%) demonstrates ethnic animosity by saying that communities should only be allowed 
to own land in their ancestral homes. 4% provide other responses, while 2% don’t know. 
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Corruption 
  
78. A number of corruption scandals have plagued the Coalition government over the past 
year, and the PEV public holds straightforward ideas as to how to fight corruption. 62% 
suggest law and order responses, with 46% who argue for sacking and prosecuting those 
responsible for corruption, with 12% who want to make laws that successfully fight 
corruption and 4% who want to create an independent and effective anti-corruption 
body. Others believe the solution remains with Kenyan society, with 15% who say the 
public must be educated on not paying bribes. Last, some believe addressing underlying 
factors of poverty will help to fight corruption, with 7% who want to address 
unemployment and poverty. 12% replied with other responses while 4% refused to 
answer. 
Electoral Reform 
 
79. Given the dissolution of the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) and the creation of an 
interim electoral body, it is important to measure how much faith respondents hold in an 
electoral process. 
 
Chart 6: In your opinion, will a new electoral body be capable of holding free and fair 
elections? 
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80. Results from Chart 6 show that the dissolution of the ECK may have been the right first 
step towards building public confidence in the electoral process again. A plurality (43%) 
are confident that a new electoral body will be capable of holding free and fair elections, 
while 37% do not and 20% remain unsure and 2% refused to answer. While a majority of 
PEV residents still need to be convinced, the relative balance between those with and 
without confidence shows that some progress has been made on this front. 
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Youth 
 
81. Graph 8 mentions the concerns for youths in PEV locales. 
 
Graph 8: What are the main issues that the youth in this area complain about? (aggregate 
responses) 
 
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
48%
19%
9%
6% 6% 4%
3% 2% 2% 1%
 
 
 
82. Responses provided in Graph 8 show that the main concerns for youths in PEV areas are 
by and large livelihood issues, including unemployment (48%), poverty (19%), getting 
loans (6%), insecurity (4%), and poor pay (2%). Other concerns are education (9%), drug 
abuse (6%), and exclusion from decision-making (3%). 2% provided other responses, 
while 1% don’t know. 
Prosecutions for PEV 
 
83. As the survey was conducted, the debate of whether and where to try people charged 
with inciting and financing PEV continued. Chart 7 shows results of whether PEV 
residents wanted to charge individuals responsible for violence, and if so, whether locally 
or internationally. 
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Chart 7: Should those individuals responsible for the post-election violence be tried through a 
local tribunal in Kenya or should they be tried by the International Criminal Court in the Hague? 
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84. A large majority of those citizens most affected by PEV are in favor of prosecution (86%). 
A majority support action taken by the international community through the Hague 
(53%), while a third (33%) prefer trying suspects locally. Only 9% think the accused 
should not be tried. 4% don’t know and 1% refused to answer. 
 
85. We asked a follow-up question probing why respondents preferred the Hague or a local 
tribunal. In support of the Hague, 15% think local tribunals are too corruption, 12% think 
there will be fair judgments for all at the ICC, 4% say there is no justice in a local tribunal 
while another 4% have no confidence in local courts and the same percentage think the 
accused would not be able to bribe their way out of the Hague. In support of local 
tribunals, 10% think it is a Kenyan affair, 5% believe a local tribunal has the power to 
prosecute, and 5% want to allow witnesses to testify. 29% gave “other” responses. 
 
86. While respondents demonstrate in support of prosecutions, we asked what would 
happen in local communities if leaders from those communities were put on trail. 
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Graph 9: If a senior politician from your community is put on trial for inciting post-election 
violence, how do you think people in your community will react? 
 
 
 
87. A third of respondents (33%) believe that their fellow community members would 
support such a trail, even against local political leaders. However, a majority (58%) 
believe that such actions could incite demonstrations (26%), violence against other 
communities (18%), and threats against other communities (14%). 5% don’t know, 2% 
provided other responses, and 2% refused to answer. Overall, most citizens in PEV areas 
do not have good perceptions of how they think their others from their community will 
respond to prosecutions, even though the public remains largely in support of such 
prosecutions. 
 
88. People most affected by PEV find an additional benefit towards prosecutions. When 
asked whether they think prosecuting individuals for PEV now will prevent violence in 
Kenya’s next general election, 58% think it will while 36% do not. 4% are unsure, and 2% 
refused to answer. 
 
 
